University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2016

FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity
Sector
Joel B. Eisen
University of Richmond, jeisen@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Joel B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 40 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F. 1 (2016).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

FERC V. EPSA AND THE PATH TO
A CLEANER ELECTRICITY SECTOR
INTRODUCTION

Joel B. Eisen *

I

t is no stretch to call Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric
Power Supply Ass’n (“EPSA”) 1 the most significant Supreme Court
decision involving the modern electric grid since the 2002 decision in
New York v. FERC validated the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) rule that undergirds modern wholesale electricity markets. 2 This
January, in a 6–2 decision authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that
FERC has authority over “demand response” (“DR”)—bids of reductions in
electricity consumption into wholesale markets3—under the Federal Power Act
(“FPA”).4 The Court also held that FERC’s formula for compensating DR at
the same wholesale market price paid to generators in the energy markets
administered by regional grid operators known as independent system operators
(“ISOs”) and regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”)5 was not arbitrary
*
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1
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
2
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 1019–20, 1028 (2002). The New York decision upheld core
provisions of FERC’s Order No. 888. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18
C.F.R. § 35,385).
3
FERC defines “demand response” as “a reduction in the consumption of electric energy by
customers from their expected consumption in response to an increase in the price of electric energy
or to incentive payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric energy.” 18 C.F.R. §
35.28(b)(4) (2015); Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority over
Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 69, 70 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?] (describing the
various forms of DR).
4
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 765, 784. Five Justices joined Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, with Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissenting. (Justice Alito recused himself from the case.)
5
Today, seven regional grid operators—ISOs and RTOs—manage transmission and oversee
wholesale power markets. See FERC, ELECTRIC MARKET OVERVIEW (2012),
https://perma.cc/729F-G46R; The Role of ISOs and RTOs, ISO/RTO COUNCIL,
https://perma.cc/6RXA-F7VZ; Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed.
Reg. 12,088 (Jan. 6, 2000) (encouraging RTOs’ formation and set forth requirements for qualifying
to be an RTO); Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,595–96 (establishing requirements for ISOs);
Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in
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and capricious. In reaching these conclusions, the Court reversed a decision of
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that had invalidated FERC’s second major
DR rule,6 Order 745.7
EPSA capped more than a decade of activity aimed at promoting DR in
wholesale electricity markets.8 Today, these markets provide power that serves
two-thirds of the nation’s electricity load.9 FERC sees enormous potential for
DR in these markets as a tool for reducing electricity consumption and thereby
balancing supply and demand and reducing costs to consumers,10 improving
reliability, 11 and achieving environmental benefits. 12 Because there had been
Electric Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 551–52 (2005) (describing requirements for ISOs and RTOs); Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in
the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 149–57 (2016) (describing the evolution of modern
wholesale power markets and their operation). The difference between “ISO” and “RTO” is
unimportant to the analysis in this Introduction. Cf. Hammond and Spence, supra, at 153 n.56
(reaching the same conclusion for a discussion of grid reliability).
ISOs and RTOs manage energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets, with the first of these at issue in EPSA. Energy markets trade power through bids that establish market clearing prices.
Id. at 154. Ancillary services markets trade reserves (generation not currently used but available to
serve load) and other services such as “regulation” (services necessary to keep grid frequency in
balance). Id. at 153. Forward capacity markets, at issue in the Supreme Court this spring in Hughes
v. Talen Energy Marketing, PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert.
granted sub nom. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382 (Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-614),
aim for resource adequacy by providing incentives to ensure sufficient generating capacity in the
region to meet projected future demand. See infra notes 63–66.
6
EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773.
7
Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 134
FERC ¶ 61,187 (2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35).
8
The Court described the introduction of DR into wholesale markets in the early 2000s. EPSA,
136 S. Ct. at 770. DR itself is nothing new, as it dates to “curtailment” and “peak shaving”
programs of the 1980s and 1990s. Jon Wellinghoff & David E. Morenoff, Recognizing the
Importance of Demand Response: The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation,
28 ENERGY L.J. 389, 394 (2007).
9
FERC, Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FERC (2016), https://perma.cc/
3GNA-JPJ9.
10
Owen Comstock, Demand Response Saves Electricity During Times of High Demand, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/BMP8-6CDA (discussing DR’s role
during times of peak demand to reduce stress on the electric grid, and showing peak demand
savings of 12,700 MW in 2014); FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 770 (citing a 2007 study showing
that “a demand response program reducing electricity usage by 3% in peak hours would lead to
price declines of 6% to 12%”).
For one particularly significant example of DR’s role in to reducing grid stress, see FERC,
ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & ADVANCED METERING 11–13 (2014),
https://perma.cc/F6MH-D2PE, which discussed DR’s important role in meeting the “numerous
challenges for electricity system operators” during the extremely cold winter of 2013–2014.
11
Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,” and the Smart Grid, 7
HOUSTON ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191, 203 (2012) (discussing DR’s role in providing
regulation in ancillary services markets and thereby improving reliability by balancing intermittent
resources such as solar and wind).
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little DR participation, however, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 stated Congress’ policy that “unnecessary barriers to demand response participation in
energy, capacity and ancillary service markets shall be eliminated.”13 Three years
later, FERC issued Order 719.14 That rule required ISOs and RTOs to revise
their tariffs and allow DR aggregators (firms that bundle demand reductions
and bid them into wholesale energy markets) 15 to participate in wholesale
markets.16 Order 719 required ISOs and RTOs to permit aggregators to bid
DR on behalf of retail customers directly into the wholesale markets, except
where a state’s laws prevented it.17 Yet barriers to entry continued to hamper
DR’s growth.18
To address this situation, FERC issued Order 745 in 2011.19 It aimed to
address “concerns that current compensation levels inhibited meaningful
demand-side participation” in wholesale markets.20 It required ISOs and RTOs
12

By reducing peak demand, DR may reduce emissions from existing power plants and help avoid
“unnecessary expenses of building new generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure”
and the pollution associated with it. Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart
Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid].
The extent to which DR leads to emissions reductions has been debated. If customers reduce
purchases from wholesale markets, but substitute polluting sources “behind the meter” such as
diesel back-up generators, the emissions reductions would be less substantial. See Del. Dep’t of Nat.
Res. & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting EPA’s “Reciprocating
Internal Combustion Engines” emissions standards that allowed back-up diesel generators to
operate more often to promote DR); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND
RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM 29
(2006), https://perma.cc/ZC9M-8J8X (noting emissions reductions as a potential benefit but
cautioning that emissions reductions are “dependent on the emissions profiles and marginal
operating costs of the generation plants in specific regions”).
13
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, § 1252(f), 119 Stat. 966 (2005).
14
Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 Fed.
Reg. 64,100–01 (Oct. 28, 2008).
15
Aggregators, or “curtailment service providers,” bundle demand reductions and bid them into
wholesale markets. Order 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 para. 19; 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(iii) (2015)
(requiring ISOs and RTOs to receive bids from aggregators). This facilitates market entry by those
customers precluded from trading on wholesale markets under RTOs’ market rules that require
bidders to offer a minimum amount of energy. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note
3, at 81.
16
Order No. 719, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,101.
17
18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(i).
18
PETER CAPPERS, JASON MACDONALD & CHARLES GOLDMAN, LAWRENCE BERKELEY
NAT’L LAB., MARKET AND POLICY BARRIERS FOR DEMAND RESPONSE PROVIDING
ANCILLARY SERVICES IN U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 3 (2013) (discussing barriers to aggregator participation in ancillary services markets and citing studies by FERC and others about barriers
to DR aggregator participation in wholesale markets).
19
Order 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187.
20
Id. para. 1.
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to compensate DR bid by aggregators in wholesale energy markets at the
prevailing market price received by generators, assuming DR resources “have
the capability to balance supply and demand and when payment of the market
price for energy to these resources is cost-effective as determined by a net
benefits test.”21 FERC justified Order 745 under two FPA provisions: Section
205,22 giving it authority to decide just and reasonable rates, and Section 206,23
giving it the power to remedy discriminatory practices affecting wholesale rates.
The Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”, the trade association for
generators in competitive markets) and other challengers opposed Order 745.
They succeeded in the D.C. Circuit, where a divided three-judge panel held
that Order 745 was “ultra vires agency action.”24 In the court’s view, DR was
solely a retail-level activity and therefore the exclusive province of the states,
FERC had no authority over it, and, moreover, giving FERC jurisdiction over
DR would have no boundaries.25 Summoning a parade of horribles, the court
believed that if Order 745 stood, FERC could extend its regulatory reach deep
into the economy, even regulating the steel and labor markets if it so chose.26
The decision threw DR’s future into chaos.27
21

18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(v).
16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012).
23
Section 206 empowers FERC to remedy a practice it finds “unjust” or “unreasonable”: if “any rule,
regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable,
unduly discriminatory or preferential,” FERC must “determine the just and reasonable rate, charge,
classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall
fix the same by order.” 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012). The discrimination, in the case of DR, was the
compensation scheme that precluded it from taking part meaningfully in the markets.
24
EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
25
Id. at 221–22. The D.C. Circuit also rejected the pricing formula itself as arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 225.
26
Id. at 221.
27
The D.C. Circuit’s decision only invalidated DR bids into energy markets. Yet because it held
that FERC lacked authority over DR, it jeopardized DR’s status in all wholesale markets. On the
same day as the decision was issued, FirstEnergy Corp. filed a complaint asking FERC to extend
its reach, bar DR bids into the PJM RTO’s capacity market, and order PJM to recalculate the
results (without DR) of its most recent capacity auction. Complaint of FirstEnergy Service Co. at
1–2, FirstEnergy Serv. Co. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC (FERC 2014) (No. EL14-55-000).
Over the next eighteen months, the result was a series of stopgap and transitional proposals
designed to adapt to the decision, leaving the ultimate fate of DR in markets up in the air. Robert
Walton, Uncertainty Is the New Constant for Demand Response Markets, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 8,
2015), https://perma.cc/M3ND-SWY3.
Uncertainty extended to how DR might be conducted as an exclusively state-level matter.
PETER CAPPERS & ANDY SATCHWELL, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE REGULATORS AND POLICYMAKERS IN A POST-FERC ORDER
745 WORLD (2015), https://perma.cc/TZ5R-UUSN (pre-EPSA analysis explaining in detail, with
references to individual states’ situations, how DR programs might be administered in the absence
of FERC authority over them).
22
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Reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the FPA’s “plain
terms” gave FERC authority to regulate DR in wholesale markets.28 Under the
FPA, FERC’s authority extends to “the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce.”29 This gives it authority, the Court stated, to regulate “both wholesale rates and the panoply of rules and practices affecting them.”30 Construing
FPA Section 206, the Court stated that FERC has authority over discriminatory “practices” that “directly affect” wholesale rates.31 Interpreting the term
“practices,” the Court stated, “As we have explained in addressing similar terms
like ‘relating to’ or ‘in connection with,’ a non-hyperliteral reading is needed to
prevent the statute from assuming near-infinite breadth.”32 The Court relied on
case precedent limiting FERC’s broad authority. Citing a D.C. Circuit case
involving California’s grid operator,33 the Court found that, “under a commonsense construction of the FPA’s language,” FERC’s jurisdiction is limited “to
rules or practices that ‘directly affect the [wholesale] rate.’”34 The Court rejected
claims by Order 745’s opponents that this construction expanded FERC’s
jurisdiction too broadly.35
Justice Kagan stated that Order 745 satisfied the “directly affecting” standard “with room to spare,” 36 observing that “market operators’ payments for
demand response commitments” are practices that “directly affect wholesale
rates.”37 The Court’s explanation was straightforward and compelling: “Wholesale demand response, in short, is all about reducing wholesale rates; so too,
then, the rules and practices that determine how those programs operate.”38
Moreover, the Court found that to hold otherwise would “conflict with the
28

FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 773 (2016).
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). As EPSA acknowledged, the FPA closed the “Attleboro gap” and
created a clear split between state and federal authority. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767 (citing Pub. Util.
Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927)).
30
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773.
31
Id. at 773–74.
32
Id. at 774.
33
Cal. Indep. Sys. Op. Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s
Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
[hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid] (discussing
CAISO’s application to limiting a “directly affecting” standard); Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart
Grid?, supra note 3, at 91–92 (discussing CAISO’s importance in empowering FERC to regulate
practices affecting wholesale rates).
34
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774 (citing Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 403).
35
Id. at 774.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
29
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Act’s core purposes by preventing all use of a tool that no one (not even EPSA)
disputes will curb prices and enhance reliability in the wholesale electricity
market.”39
The “directly affecting” standard, and the Court’s application of it to DR,
rest on a cogently articulated interpretation of the FPA.40 It is consistent with
the analysis in the amicus brief that the author and three co-authors filed with
the Court on behalf of twenty-five energy law scholars. 41 And, a historical
analysis of the “practices affecting rates” language demonstrates that it has been
interpreted broadly and flexibly in the context of the FPA and other regulatory
statutes since the early 1900s, and that in the specific setting of the electric grid,
the “directly affecting” test is the logical culmination of developments that have
been decades in the making.42
In granting FERC this broad authority, the Court rejected an argument
that had swayed the D.C. Circuit: that FERC was impermissibly regulating
retail sales, authority over which is allocated to the states under the FPA.43 As
the Court noted, “a FERC regulation does not run afoul of [the FPA’s] proscription just because it affects—even substantially—the quantity or terms of
retail sales. . . . To the contrary, transactions that occur on the wholesale
market have natural consequences at the retail level. And so too, of necessity,
will FERC’s regulation of those wholesale matters.”44 When FERC regulates
the wholesale markets, the Court concluded, “then no matter the effect on
retail rates,”45 the FPA does not preclude FERC from regulating. And, the
Court stated, “in setting rules for demand response, that is all FERC has

39

Id. at 773.
The Court’s confirmation of FERC’s authority over DR is supported by literature on Order 745
that demonstrate that the Commission had this authority, notwithstanding its opponents’ claims.
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33; Eisen, Who
Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 3, at 90–92; cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Primer on Demand
Response and a Critique of FERC Order 745, GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102, 108
(2012) (expressing concerns about Order 745 but nonetheless suggesting that it should survive
judicial review).
41
Amicus Curiae Brief of Energy Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, FERC v. EPSA, 136 S.
Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840) (urging the Court to find that FERC had jurisdiction over DR bid
into the organized wholesale markets under the FPA’s “practices affecting rates” provision, and
suggesting that it adopt the “directly affecting” limitation expressed in CAISO).
42
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33 (discussing
the history of the “practices affecting rates” provision, concluding that the Court properly found
that it conferred on FERC authority over DR, and outlining four guidelines for courts and FERC
for deciding which matters FERC properly regulates and which are left to the states).
43
EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
44
See EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776.
45
Id.
40
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done.” 46 Citing ONEOK v. Learjet, 47 its most recent decision on FERC’s
authority, Justice Kagan observed that, “the Commission’s justifications for
regulating demand response are all about, and only about, improving the
wholesale market.”48
Finally, the Court rejected an argument that paying DR providers market
prices gives them a “windfall—a kind of ‘double-payment’—unless market
operators subtract the savings associated with conserving electricity from the
ordinary compensation level.”49 The Court found that in setting this compensation formula, the “Commission engaged in reasoned decisionmaking—that it
weighed competing views, selected a compensation formula with adequate
support in the record, and intelligibly explained the reasons for making that
choice.”50

FERC V. EPSA IS A LANDMARK DECISION, AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
CANNOT BE UNDERSTATED
First, the Court made a definitive pronouncement on FERC’s authority
over end users of electricity who also provide resources back to the electric
grid. 51 The “directly affecting” standard now governs how these customers
participate in the wholesale markets. That will have immediate implications for
DR’s future in the markets, with specific short-term impacts on DR programs
that ISOs and RTOs have either underway or on the drawing board.52 In the
long run, this concise, broad jurisdictional standard gives FERC considerable

46

Id.
ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015); see also Emily Hammond, Energy Law’s
Jurisdictional Boundaries: A Call for Course Correction, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (April 28,
2014), https://perma.cc/46AC-XXBP [hereinafter Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional
Boundaries: A Call for Course Correction] (discussing the ONEOK decision).
48
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776–77 (citing ONEOK, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1599).
49
Id. at 782; cf. Pierce, supra note 40, at 108 (opposing the pricing scheme but concluding that the
net benefits test alleviated his concerns by limiting the likely amount of overcompensation).
50
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782; Emily Hammond, Deference for Interesting Times, 28 GEO. ENVTL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript on file with author) (stating that EPSA’s analysis of the
pricing issue “illustrates the best of [State Farm] hard-look review for its detailed explanation and
careful look at the agency’s reasoning”).
51
See generally Sharon Jacobs, Consumer Generation, ECOL. L.Q. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing
challenges to managing “prosumers” on the electric grid).
52
David T. Doot et al., What’s Next for Wholesale Electricity Market Operators, LAW360 (Feb.
11, 2016), https://perma.cc/E2WS-MQVJ (discussing the impacts of EPSA on current DR docket
proceedings in the PJM Interconnection LLC, ISO-New England, Midcontinent ISO, New York
ISO, and California ISO). The first two of these RTOs will see considerable change, because their
DR programs were thrown into uncertainty after the D.C. Circuit’s decision. See id.
47
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flexibility to promote a cleaner, more efficient Smart Grid.53 FERC has ample
authority over the electric grid, so long as its initiatives may be construed as
“practices” that “directly affect” wholesale electricity rates. This opens up a vast
new frontier for FERC to innovate and pursue broad policy goals—such as
promoting clean and renewable energy—in the wholesale markets, as long as
the core “directly affecting” standard is met. As one analysis has demonstrated,
FERC could justify a (hypothetical) carbon price in the wholesale markets
under this standard.54
EPSA’s treatment of the split between federal and state jurisdiction over
the electric grid is also noteworthy. The Court concluded that FERC’s authority in the wholesale markets over DR is not exclusive and must coexist with
state jurisdiction. Indeed, EPSA features “notable solicitude” for the states’
historical role in electricity regulation.55 Under Orders 719 and 745, states can
also exercise control over DR aggregators. They can prohibit consumers from
bidding DR into wholesale markets, license aggregators and conduct any DR
programs that do not involve bidding into the wholesale markets. Finally,
because states set retail rates, they can “insulate them from price fluctuations in
the wholesale market.”56
This analysis heralds a new era of allocating jurisdictional responsibility
over the electric grid. It recognizes that both FERC and the states can simultaneously take actions impacting the wholesale markets, and therefore
contemplates concurrent regulatory jurisdiction.57 This might appear to be a
break from the jurisdictional dividing line that has characterized electricity
regulation since the FPA’s enactment in 1935. Under that well-known standard, as noted above, federal jurisdiction extends to wholesale transactions and
the states retain jurisdiction over retail sales.58 However, as the Court has now
noted,59 reflecting the views of many other observers,60 this bright line jurisdictional split is unworkable in the modern, interconnected electric grid.
53

For a discussion of the Smart Grid’s opportunities and challenges, see Eisen, Smart Regulation
and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra note 12.
54
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33, at 38–45.
55
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779.
56
Id. at 777.
57
See generally Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
58
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 768.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33, at
6–7; Rossi, supra note 57; Robert R. Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and
State Regulation of Today’s Electric Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203 (2015); Sharon Jacobs, Bypassing
Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885, 941 (2015) (“[T]he
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EPSA eschews this last remnant of the bygone era of “dual federalism”61
that treated federal and state jurisdiction formalistically as separate and distinct
spheres of authority. Instead, it recognizes that state and federal authority over
the electric grid must be construed as overlapping. This has enormous implications going forward. Working with the “directly affecting” test may yield a
clearer picture of state and federal concurrent jurisdiction, preserving room for
each level of government to craft policies for integrating clean and renewable
energy into the electric grid, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving
other goals.62
However, this new approach leaves many questions unanswered. One issue
not addressed in EPSA is how far states can go in electricity regulation if their
laws impact wholesale markets. This spring, the Court will test this proposition—and therefore, the “directly affecting” test’s contours—in Hughes v.
Talen Energy Marketing. 63 Hughes involves Maryland’s law that provided
incentives for a new power plant to locate in the state. Maryland state officials
believed the price signals produced by the PJM capacity market were not
leading to construction of enough new power plants in the state. To prompt
building of a new plant, the law offered a subsidy above the market clearing
price. FERC claimed this interfered with pricing in the wholesale markets, and
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.64 It found that field preemption
applied, concluding the scheme of federal regulation of wholesale markets is so
all-encompassing that it leaves no room for the state law.65
EPSA upheld FERC’s authority generally over DR, and because it did not
evaluate a specific state law’s impacts on wholesale markets, the preemption
federalism boundaries drawn in 1935 in the Federal Power Act may no longer be appropriate in
today’s world.”); Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance Electric Grid
Neutrality, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97, 99 (2015).
61
Wiseman, supra note 60, at 97; see also Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exemption, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 139 (2001)
(describing the “death” of dual federalism generally).
62
See generally Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33,
and accompanying text (discussing a hypothetical carbon adder in the wholesale markets).
63
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom.
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382 (Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-614). The speed with
which the Court is acting to clarify jurisdictional issues left open after EPSA is itself unusual. Ari
Peskoe, Electricity Regulation Is Back at the Supreme Court, Again, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE
(Feb. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/M4NZ-JZ93 (“It is highly unusual for the Supreme Court to
decide two cases about electricity regulation in a single term.”).
64
See generally Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 467. The Third Circuit struck down a similar New Jersey
law, and while the Court did not accept that case for review, the decision in Hughes is widely
expected to impact the New Jersey law, due to the similarity between the two states’ laws. PPL
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
65
Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 476.
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issue did not arise. At oral argument in Hughes, the Justices appeared ready to
uphold the Fourth Circuit.66 The Court can be expected to reiterate FERC’s
sole authority over wholesale rates, and may use principles of conflict preemption (instead of field preemption) to decide that Maryland’s law conflicts with
the FPA and cannot stand because it directly changes the amount a power
plant owner receives from the wholesale markets. This would also be warranted
under EPSA. Setting rules for capacity market auctions is an obvious example
of a “practice” that “directly affects” wholesale rates.
Yet the states’ authority over power plants is also unquestioned. States may
select the types, sizes, and sites of power plants to be built in the state. Using
conflict preemption principles might leave room for other state incentives to
promote power plant development, as long as the state does not interfere
directly with wholesale rates.67 A clue to how the Court may set the boundaries
between federal and state jurisdiction comes from the test it enunciated in
ONEOK, under which a state law is preempted if it is “aimed directly at
interstate purchasers and wholesales for resale.”68 But the challenge of striking
the jurisdictional balance accurately in Hughes shows the work begun in EPSA
is hardly complete.
Finally, EPSA is significant as a signal of the Court’s approach to statutory
interpretation. On the issue of FERC’s authority over DR, one might have
expected the Court to conduct a Chevron 69 analysis. Recently, the Court
concluded that agencies are accorded Chevron deference when they are delineating the extent of their jurisdiction. 70 The Court could have found the
statutory term “practices” or “affect” to be ambiguous, and then deferred to
FERC’s permissible construction in Order 745. Because the Court found that
66

See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382 (Oct.
19, 2015) (No. 14-614).
67
As the Solicitor General mentioned in an amicus brief in Hughes, one example would be
favorable tax policies for power plant development. Brief For the United States as Amicus Curiae at
19, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382 (Oct. 19, 2015) (No. 14-614). The Court
would be more likely to view this as comparable to state antitrust law (at issue in ONEOK) that
applies broadly to a number of industries, and less likely to invalidate it as taking “direct aim” at the
wholesale markets. Id. at 22.
68
ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599–1600 (2015); see also Hammond, Energy
Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries: A Call for Course Correction, supra note 47 (discussing potential
applications of this test).
69
See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also
Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 3, at 74 (arguing that Order 745 was supportable under Chevron).
70
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); Hammond, Deference for Interesting Times,
supra note 50, at 4 (noting that “agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations are also awarded Chevron
deference”).
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Order 745 “complies with the FPA’s plain terms,”71 however, it grounded its
holding in the statutory text and explicitly stated that it was not addressing
FERC’s claim that it was entitled to Chevron deference.72 This makes EPSA
all the more important because the Court’s construction of the FPA makes it
difficult for future Commissions to alter or reverse this finding.73
Putting this all together, EPSA’s importance is evident. It highlights how
an eighty-year-old statute can be retooled for the modern era74 and yet retain
consistency with a body of law spanning over more than 100 years.75 FERC’s
ability to control “practices” on an industry-wide basis, with appropriate limits
set by the Court, may have far-reaching consequences almost unimaginable
today. Consider the analogy of the modern telecommunications industry.76 A
1956 decision—Hush-A-Phone77—allowed phone customers to attach a plastic
device to a phone to reduce the risk of overhearing a phone call,78 and the 1968
FCC Carterfone 79 ruling invalidated AT&T’s prohibition of a device that
manually connected private two-way radio systems to the telephone network.80
71

FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760,773 (2016).
Id. at 773 n.5 (“Because we think FERC’s authority clear, we need not address the Government’s
alternative contention that FERC’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference under
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984).”); see also
Emily Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries: Staying the Course, GEO. WASH. L.
REV. DOCKET (Jan. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/MR4G-UZCN (discussing EPSA as part of a
“trend toward more traditional, pre-Chevron approaches to interpreting regulatory statutes”).
73
Hammond, Deference for Interesting Times, supra note 50, at 4 (noting that under Brand X, if
an agency’s construction of its own jurisdiction was accorded Chevron deference, “this means that
an agency could also change its view of its jurisdictional authority provided the statute is ambiguous”).
74
For a general discussion of this challenge, see Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes,
New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014).
75
See generally Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 33.
76
This analogy is explored in Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing
Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1712 (2014) [hereinafter Eisen, An
Open Access Distribution Tariff].
77
Id. at 1743 n.161 (citing Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956)).
78
Hush-A-Phone involved the “practices affecting rates” provision of the Communications Act of
1934, worded similarly to the FPA’s provision. In that case, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument
by the monopoly company—AT&T—that claimed the statutory provision gave it the right to
“forbid attachment to the telephone of any device ‘not furnished by the telephone company.’”
Hush-A-Phone Corp., 238 F.2d at 267, 269. The D.C. Circuit established a principle that
prohibiting a customer’s “foreign attachment” (the Hush-A-Phone was a plastic device designed to
fit over the ear and reduce background interference with phone calls) was “in unwarranted interference with the telephone subscriber’s right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are
privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental.” Id. at 269; see also Eisen, An Open Access
Distribution Tariff, supra note 76, at 1744 n.162.
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In re Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
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Id.; see also Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff, supra note 76, at 1744 n.163.
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These decisions established fundamental principles that enabled the connection
of much more sophisticated equipment to communications networks. Without
Hush-A-Phone and Carterfone there would have been no answering machines,
fax machines, and no modems connected without telephone company interference. So, without these decisions—both of which attracted little public
recognition at the time—there would be no consumer use of the Internet.81
Is EPSA the electric grid’s Hush-A-Phone or Carterfone? Time will tell.
For now, FERC has authority over practices “directly affecting” wholesale rates,
and Order 745’s core requirement has been upheld: when DR is bid into the
wholesale markets, it must be compensated at the same level that generators
receive. 82 Still, as noted above, there are significant issues remaining with
respect to EPSA’s scope.
The Symposium begins with two Essays that focus on EPSA’s implications for states and their clean energy policy goals. In The Essential Role of
State Engagement in Demand Response, Maryland Public Service Commissioner Anne Hoskins and Rhode Island Public Utilities Commissioner Paul
Roberti discuss EPSA’s potential impacts on their respective states (and others),
including the interplay with each state’s respective RTO, and discuss the extent
to which the decision improves the potential for cooperative electricity federalism.83 In FERC v. EPSA and Adjacent State Regulation of Customer Energy
Resources, Professor Jim Rossi and former FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff
explore the decision’s impact on states’ clean energy initiatives and posit that
the decision gives states flexibility while ensuring that their policies complement federal programs.84
The next two essays advance approaches for fostering grid-edge innovation
in the aftermath of EPSA. In Balancing on the Grid Edge: Regulating for
Economic Efficiency in the Wake of FERC v. EPSA, Denise A. Grab explains
why it is optimal to allow all regulators who are making policy decisions involving technologies at the grid edge to consider both the demand- and supply-side
effects of their decisions, ideally through a comprehensive benefit-cost analy-
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See Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff, supra note 76, at 1744 n.167 (quoting Jason
Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 15 (FCC Office of Plans & Policy,
Working Paper No. 31, 1999), https://perma.cc/K75D-ZJWC.
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FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 784 (2016).
83
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40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 14 (2016).
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Jim Rossi & Jon Wellinghoff, FERC v. EPSA and Adjacent State Regulation of Customer
Energy Resources, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 23 (2016).
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sis. 85 She draws upon examples from New York’s ongoing Reforming the
Energy Vision proceeding.86 Professor Michael Wara’s Fostering Competition
in the 21st Century Electricity Industry considers the potential of the Department of Justice’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines in facilitating energy
innovation and the development of robust and fair markets for energy services.87
Finally, Professor Sharon B. Jacobs’s Energy Deference analyzes EPSA’s
second question presented: whether the price FERC set for demand response
in wholesale markets was arbitrary and capricious.88 Jacobs frames the Court’s
analysis within the burgeoning administrative law literature on deference to
agency actions. She argues that EPSA is faithful to an approach of “super
deference” because it relies on “deference proxies”: the procedural safeguards
employed by the agency, the presence or absence of expert opinions sanctioning
the agency’s choice, or even the presence or absence of a dissenting agency
decisionmaker.89
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